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Abstract 
 
This paper considers aspects of the growth process of countries that are 
members of a fully integrated economy (FIE), i.e., an economy with free 
mobility of goods and factors among members, and whose members share the 
same technology.  We first demonstrate that each member’s share of total FIE 
output and its shares of total FIE stocks of each productive factor will be equal.  
If economic polices are harmonized across FIE members then the equality of 
output and factor shares implies that the growth in any FIE member’s output 
can be considered random. Given this, we build on Gabaix’s (1999) result for 
the distribution of relative city sizes to show that the distribution of output and 
factor shares among FIE members will exhibit Zipf’s law.  We empirically 
examine for Zipf’s law for the distribution of output and factor shares across 
two (presumably) integrated economies: the 51 US states and 14 European 
Union (EU) countries.  Our findings support Zipf’s law for US states and 
indicate convergence towards this law among EU countries.  Our findings 
suggest that models of growth of members within an FIE should embody a key 
assumption: the normalized growth process is random and homogeneous across 
FIE members. 
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Zipf’s Law for Integrated Economies 
 
An extensive body of work has explored the role of international trade and of 
factor mobility between politically defined regions (e.g., countries) as mechanisms 
generating endogenous economic growth.  For example, Grossman and Helpman 
(1991) show that trade generally enhances growth, particularly when it facilitates the 
international transmission of knowledge. Similarly, Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) 
show that increased trade due to economic integration may have both level and growth 
effects depending upon the processes by which R&D and information flow across 
borders.  Devereux and Lapham (1994) extend Rivera-Batiz and Romer’s model to 
show that, even without knowledge flows, the balanced growth rate when there is free 
trade in goods alone exceeds that in autarky, provided that initial levels of national 
income differ across countries. 
Regarding factor mobility, Baldwin and Martin (2004) show that the relation 
between growth and the agglomeration of economic activity depends crucially on the 
extent of capital mobility between regions.  Similarly, Viaene and Zilcha (2002) show 
that while complete capital market integration among countries has a positive effect on 
outputs, it does not raise long-run growth rates above autarky values.  Instead, these 
growth rates are affected only by parameters that describe the accumulation of human 
capital.   
Increases in trade or factor mobility can arise from greater economic integration 
between markets.  In the limit, such integration would be represented by a fully 
integrated economy (FIE) in which there is free mobility of goods and factors among 
FIE members. While prior work has demonstrated the potentially important role of 
trade and factor mobility as influences on economic growth, less attention has been 
given to the question of how trade and factor mobility impact the distribution of output 
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across members of a FIE, and hence how these influences affect the relative economic 
position of members.  Apart from being simply a question of distributional 
consequences, an analysis of this question has important implications for models that 
are used to characterize the growth processes of FIE members.  As we will demonstrate 
in this paper, the distribution of output and factor shares across FIE members can be 
expected to conform to a rank-share distribution that exhibit Zipf’s law, which indicates 
a specific relationship between the ranks and values of a variable.1  This result implies 
that models used to characterize the growth of members within an FIE must embody a 
key assumption: that the underlying normalized growth process is random and 
homogeneous across members. 
In what follows, we first demonstrate the result of Viaene and Zilcha (2002) 
that each FIE member’s share of total FIE output will equal its shares of the total FIE 
stock of each productive factor (i.e., physical capital and human capital).  If economic 
policies are largely harmonized across members then this equal-share property implies 
that the growth in any member’s shares of FIE output and factor stocks can be 
considered a random outcome.  Following Gabaix’s (1999), if it is assumed that the 
underlying distribution of growth rates is common across members then the limiting 
distribution of output shares (and factor shares) among FIE members will exhibit Zipf’s 
law.  We then show that if the share distributions do exhibit Zipf’s law then the values 
of the output and factor shares are completely determined once the number of FIE 
members is specified.   
Given the theoretical expectation of Zipf’s law for output and factor shares, we 
empirically examine for this law within two (presumably) integrated economies: the 51 
                                                 
1 Zipf’s law for city sizes is an empirical regularity widely documented in the urban and regional 
economics literature.  Interpretive surveys of the implications of rank-size distributions for urban growth 
include Brakman et al. (2001), Fujita et al. (1999), and Gabaix and Ioannides (2004). 
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US states and 14 countries of the European Union (EU).  The data generally cover the 
period from 1965 to 2000.   Our empirical results convincingly support Zipf’s law for 
US states and they indicate convergence toward Zipf’s law for EU countries.   
 
1 Output and Factor Shares in Integrated Economies 
Consider an economy that produces a single good by means of a constant return 
to scale production function that takes the following form: 
(1) ( , )t t tY F K H=  
where Yt is the level of output, Kt the level of physical capital stock and Ht the level of 
human capital stock, all at time t.  For ease of exposition, we assume the production 
function takes the Cobb Douglas form:2 
(2) t t tY AK H
a 1-a=  
where A is a scale parameter and a is capital’s share of total output. By definition, the 
marginal product of physical capital is: 
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Combining (2) and (3) gives: 
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We now consider the marginal product of physical capital in another economy 
that shares the same technology: 
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2 The incorporation of physical and human capital has repeatedly been shown to have empirical 
relevance in production.  In particular, the Cobb-Douglas production function provides a good fit on data 
for the US and other industrial countries (Mankiw et al., 1992). 
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where “*” indicates variables of the second economy.  If physical capital is perfectly 
mobile between the two economies, and hence the two economies constitute a fully 
integrated economy (FIE), then capital will flow from the low to high rate of return 
economy until its rate of return is equalized.   From the equality between (3) and (5) we 
obtain: 
(6) 
*
*
*
*
t t t t
t t t t
H H H H
K K K K
+
= =
+
  
Likewise, using (4) and(5): 
(7) 
* *
* *
t t t t
t t t t
Y Y Y Y
K K K K
+
= =
+
   
Combining (6) and (7) yields the so-called (Bowen et al. (2005)) equal-share 
relationship: 
(8) * * *
t t t
t t t t t t
Y K H
Y Y K K H H
= =
+ + +
   
Expression (8) determines the distribution of output and the distribution of factors 
between the two economies.  Hence, with perfect capital mobility, each economy’s 
share of total FIE output and each economy’s share of total FIE physical capital stock 
equals its share of total FIE stock of human capital.  As discussed in Bowen et al. 
(2005), the equal-share relationship (8) has three important extensions.  First, this 
relationship remains valid even if there are technological differences and differences in 
factor rates of return between the two economies; such differences only cause a 
rescaling of the original variables.  Second, relationship (8) can be extended to the case 
of a FIE that consists of N members.  If these N members are assumed to have the same 
technology, and there is free mobility of at least one factor (physical or human capital) 
among them, then the equalization of factor rates of return implies the following form 
of the equal-share relationship: 
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(9) 
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or, written in terms of shares, yit = kit = hit.   Finally, if FIE members have harmonized 
economic and social policies (e.g., fiscal, education, industrial policies) then the equal-
share property implies that the relative performance of any one member can be 
considered to be a random variable dependent on the particular state of nature at time t.    
 
2 Rank-Share Distributions and Zipf’s Law  
A rank-share distribution is related to the concept of a rank-size distribution.  
The latter describes a particular relationship between the size and rank of a variable 
across a set of observational units.  For example, let the variable be city size as 
measured by a city’s population, and order cities in decreasing order of their size to 
obtain the rank of each city according to its size.  A rank-size distribution for city size 
exists if the relationship between the natural logarithm of these two variables is linear 
and exhibits a negative slope.  The special case of Zipf’s law arises when the slope 
value equals -1.  The existence of Zipf’s law for city sizes is a widely documented 
empirical regularity (Brakman et al. (2001), Fujita et al. (1999), and Gabaix and 
Ioannides (2004)). 
Several explanations have been advanced for the observed regularity of Zipf’s 
law with respect to the distribution of city sizes.  Some argue it constitutes an optimal 
spatial pattern that arises when congestion and urbanization externalities interact as part 
of the process of development and growth of cities.  Such forces are usually found in 
core models of urban and regional growth (Eaton and Eckstein, 1997; Black and 
Henderson 1999; Brakman et al., 1999).  Others have stressed more mechanical forces 
that often involve a random growth process for city size.  A recent example is Gabaix 
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(1999), who draws on Gibrat’s law3 to assume that cities follow a random but common 
growth process.  Normalizing city population by a country’s total population, Gabaix 
shows (his Proposition 1) that if these population shares evolve as geometric Brownian 
motion (with an infinitesimal barrier) then the steady state distribution of population 
shares will be a rank-size distribution that exhibits Zipf’s law.    
As previously noted, the equal-share property for members of an FIE, together 
with an assumed harmonization of FIE member’s economic policies, implies that the 
relative performance of any one FIE member can be considered a random variable.  
Given this, we can adopt Gabaix’s (1999) specification and assume that the growth rate 
of the share for variable j (e.g., j = output) evolves as geometric Brownian motion, and 
moreover, that the distribution of such growth rates is common to all FIE members 
(i.e., Gibrat’s law).4  As in Gabaix (1999), this implies that the limit distribution of the 
shares of variable j across FIE members will be a rank-share distribution that exhibits 
Zipf’s law.  We now show that if the distribution of shares does conform to Zipf’s law 
then the share values are in fact completely determined once the number of FIE 
members is specified.  
Consider a FIE consisting of N members.  Let Sij denote member i’s share of the 
total FIE amount of variable j (e.g., j = output) and let Rij denote the rank of member i 
in the ranking of the values of variable j across all members (i = 1,…, N).  We assume 
that Rij = 1 for the member with the largest value (share) of variable j and that Rij = N  
                                                 
3 Gibrat’s law (Gibrat, 1931) states that firm growth is independent of firm size.  
4 The equal-share relationship implies that the common mean rate of growth is zero since 
1
N
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for the member with the lowest value (share) of variable j.  If variable j has a rank-share 
distribution then we can write:5  
(10) ( )1 jij j ijS R bg=  
where b j > 0 and 0 < gj < 1 is the share of variable j for the member with the highest 
rank (i.e., when Rij = 1).  Zipf’s law corresponds to b j  = 1.   
Let Vij denote the level of variable j for member i.  Now assume, without loss of 
generality, that member 1 has the highest value of variable j and let d ij be member i’s 
value of variable j relative to that of member 1 (i.e., d ij = Vij / V1j), so that d1j = 1.  Now 
order the values of variable j in descending order.  This ordering of the values of 
variable j across the i = 1, …, N members can then be written:  
(11) V1j  >  d2j V1j  >  d3j V1j  > ... >  dNj V1j 
Since the total FIE amount of variable j is (1 + d1j + d2j + …+ dNj)V1j, (11) implies the 
following relations between member ranks and shares: 
(12) 
1
2 3
2
2
2 3
3
3
2 3
2 3
1
 1 :   
1 ...
 2 :   
1 ...
 3 :   
1 ...
 N :
1 ...
j
j j Nj
j
j
j j Nj
j
j
j j Nj
j
Nj
j j Nj
Rank S
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Rank S
d d d
d
d d d
d
d d d
d
d d d
N
=
+ + + +
=
+ + + +
=
+ + + +
=
+ + + +
M M
 
Expressions (12) indicate that the value of each share Sij depends only on the 
number of members N.  In the special case where the distribution of shares exhibits 
Zipf’s law then it must be that d2j = 1/2, d3j = 1/3, d4j = 1/4, etc. and the sequence of 
                                                 
5 The literature usually expresses this as ( ) jij j ijS R
b
g
-
= . We depart from this usual form to simply our 
later presentation and discussion of our empirical analysis. 
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shares (Sij) then becomes an unbounded Harmonic series.  Therefore, if Zipf’s law 
holds, the theoretical shares in (12) can be computed once the number of members (N) 
is specified.  For example, our empirical analysis will consider two FIEs: the 51 US 
states and 14 EU countries.  The theoretical share values for the N = 51 US states are: 
0.2213, 0.1106, 0.0738, 0.0553,…, 0.0043.   For the N = 14 EU countries the 
theoretical share values are: 0.3075, 0.1538, 0.1025, 0.0769,…, 0.0220.  By the equal-
share condition (9), the theoretical share values for member i are the same for output, 
physical capital and human capital. 
Finally, we note that if the share distributions of output, physical capital and 
human capital shares are each assumed to exhibit Zipf’s law then, since the theoretical 
share values depend only on the number of FIE members, the equal-share relationship 
derived in the preceding section must hold.  Equally, it can be demonstrated that the 
equal-share property is also obtained if one assumes that output shares alone exhibit 
Zipf’s law, and one further assumes that FIE members have identical, homogenous of 
degree one, production functions.  
 
3 Empirical Specification 
To empirically assess the hypothesis that output and factor shares have a rank-
share distribution that exhibits Zipf’s law we can take the natural logarithm of each side 
of (10) to obtain: 
(13) ( ) ( )log log 1ij j j ij ijS R uq b= + +  1,..., ; , ,i N j y k h= =  
where qj = log(gj) and we have appended the error term uij which is assumed to have the 
usual properties (i.e., i.i.d. with mean zero and constant variance).  Estimates of the 
intercept and slope parameter in (13) can be formed by regressing the share of variable 
j on the inverse of the rank value across members of a given FIE.   
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In what follows we will separately estimate (13) for the output share (y), the 
physical capital share (k) and the human capital share (h).  We then perform a set of 
tests intended to examine for evidence of rank-share distribution that exhibits Zipf’s 
law.  To examine for evidence of a rank-share distribution we test if the estimated slope 
parameter in each equation is significantly different from zero.  To examine for Zipf’s 
law we test if the estimated slope is significantly different from one.  To examine for 
evidence of the equal-share relationship we test for the homogeneity of the slope 
estimates (i.e., if by = bk = bh).  We further test for the equal-share relationship for the 
highest rank member (i.e., California for US states and Germany for EU countries) by 
testing homogeneity of the intercepts (i.e., if qy = qk = qh).   Finally, we examine if the 
distribution of shares predicted by (13) conforms to the distributions of observed and 
theoretical shares (computed using (12)).  
We estimate (13) for each of our three variables (output, physical capital and 
human capital) with respect to the 51 US states and 14 EU countries.  For US states, we 
use annual cross-section data covering the period from 1990 to 2000.  For EU countries 
the data instead consists of cross-sections equally spaced at 5 year intervals; these data  
generally cover the periods from 1965 to 2000.  The Appendix gives a complete 
description of the data. 
 
4 Results 
Table 1 reports regression estimates of (13) for the share of output, physical 
capital and human capital across US states. Table 2 presents such estimates for the 
sample of EU countries.6  Over both set of results, the adjusted R-squares fall in the 
                                                 
6 The standard errors reported in these tables are “robust” (Newey and West, 1987). 
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range from 0.791 to 0.945, indicating a strong relationship between the share and rank 
of each variable.  
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
For US states, Table 1 indicates strong support for the hypotheses that the 
output and factor share distributions conform to a rank-share distribution; in all cases 
the hypothesis that the slope coefficient is zero can be strongly rejected (p-values < 
0.001).  In addition, in no case can we reject (at the 5% level) the hypothesis that the 
slope coefficient is significantly different from unity, indicating that each of the three 
share distributions exhibit Zipf’s law.  This is a striking empirical result, and is 
consistent with the finding of many studies in the urban and regional economics 
literature that Zipf’s law holds for the distribution of city sizes.  
For EU countries, Table 2 indicates strong support for the hypothesis that the 
output and factor share distributions conform to a rank-share distribution; in all cases 
we can strongly reject the hypothesis that the slope coefficient is zero (p-values < 
0.001).  However, unlike US states, the hypothesis that the rank-share distribution 
exhibits Zipf’s law can, in some cases, be rejected at the 5% level.  In particular, the 
hypothesis of Zipf’s law can be rejected for the distribution of output shares in the early 
sample years (1960, 1965 and 1970) but not in later years (1975 and thereafter).  A 
similar pattern emerges for the distribution of the human capital share: Zipf’s law is 
rejected for 1985 and earlier years but not for the years after 1985.  Finally, for physical 
capital, Zipf’s law is rejected in three (i.e., 1985, 1995 and 2000) of the eight years.  
We note that the value of the slope coefficient for the output and human capital 
distributions appears to converge towards unity over time.   
Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) have demonstrated using Monte Carlo simulation 
that regression estimates of rank-share distributions have an inherent bias that 
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diminishes with the number of observational units (e.g., cities or countries).  
Specifically, they show that an OLS estimate of the slope parameter in (13) will be 
biased upward and that the estimated standard error will be biased downward.  These 
biases would lead one to more often reject Zipf’s law when it is in fact true. 
Following Gabaix and Ioannides (2004), we examined for the extent of these 
biases in our analysis by conducting a Monte Carlo analysis of OLS estimates of (13) 
under the assumption that Zipf’s law ho lds.  Table 3 presents the results of this analysis 
conducted for five different numbers of FIE members.  Three facts emerge from this 
analysis. First, the OLS slopes are indeed biased upward (rows 2 and 3);  the upward 
bias is 0.081 for US states (N = 51)  and 0.172 for EU countries (N = 14).  Second, the 
OLS standard errors are biased downward relative to the true standard errors (rows 4 
and 5).  The true 95% confidence interval (row 6) is therefore wider compared to that 
based on the OLS standard error.  Third, the magnitude of each bias falls the higher the 
number of members.  These results suggest that our finding that Zipf’s law holds for 
the distribution of output and factor shares among US states is highly robust.  For EU 
countries, the upward bias in the estimated slope coefficient together with the 
downward bias in the standard error may account for the rejection of Zipf’s for physical 
capital in some sample years. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 Table 4 reports the results of tests of the equal-share relationship.  Specifically, 
Table 4 reports p-values for testing the hypothesis of intercept homogeneity and slope 
homogeneity across the three share distributions in each sample year.7   For US states, 
data were available for all three shares only in 1990 and 2000.  In neither year can we 
                                                 
7 These tests were performed by establishing, in each year, a system comprising the three share equations 
but without initially imposing any cross-equation parameter restrictions. 
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reject the hypotheses of intercept equality and slope equality, supporting the equal-
share relationship for US states.  Except for 1965, the results also indicate support for 
the equal-share relationship for EU countries.8 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 Finally, Figures 1 and 2 provide a graphical analysis of the observed shares, the 
theoretically expected shares (assuming Zipf’s law), and the shares predicted using the 
estimated rank-share equation for the output share in 2000.9  Figure 1 for US states 
indicates that the distribution of actual output shares in 2000 closely follows the 
theoretical values, except for the first observation.  Figure 2 for the EU shows a similar 
degree of “fit” between the three sets of shares.  The differences between actual and 
theoretical share values (results not shown) are comparable in magnitude for the US 
states and EU countries.   
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
 There are several explanations for the observed deviation in actual share values 
from their theoretical values.  One is that the theoretical share distribution is a steady 
state prediction and our sample values may not represent this ideal.  Another is that our 
model assumes that the FIE is “closed,” in that goods and factor flows arise only 
between FIE members.  In reality, there exist important trade and factor flows between 
US states, and EU countries, with entities that are outside each of these defined 
integrated economies.  
 
                                                 
8 Bowen et al. (2005) found that the equal-share relationship held for US states and the same 14 EU 
countries based on annual cross-section estimates of equations that linked output and factor shares (but 
not their ranks).   
9 For example, in 2000, Pennsylvania ranked 6th among US states in terms of output shares; its actual 
share was 0.0402 while its theoretical share is 0.0369.  For the EU, in 2000 the Netherlands ranked 6th in 
terms of output shares; its actual share was 0.0469 while its theoretical share is 0.0513. 
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5 Summary and Conclusions  
This paper demonstrated that among members of a fully integrated economy 
(FIE), in which there is free exchange of goods and factors and where members share 
the same production technology, each member’s share of total FIE output will equal its 
shares of total FIE physical capital and total FIE human capital.  This result is called 
the equal-share relationship.  In this setting, it was then argued that the growth in any 
member’s share can be considered to derive from a random process.  If this process is 
common across FIE members then the limiting distribution of each share across FIE 
members will take the form of a rank-share distribution that exhibits Zipf’s law.  Given 
this, it was then demonstrated that the theoretically expected share values of each FIE 
member are deterministic, and depend only on the number of FIE members.  Finally, by 
the equal-share property, these theoretically expected share values would be identical 
for output and productive factors.  
We examined empirically for evidence that the distribution of output and factor 
shares exhibit Zipf’s law with respect to two “integrated economies”: the 51 US states 
and 14 EU countries.  Our results indicated that Zipf’s law holds among US states for 
the distribution of output, physical capital and human capital shares, and also that these 
output and factor share distributions are identical, confirming the equal-share 
relationship for US states.   
For the EU countries, the results indicated mixed support of Zipf’s law.  The 
results generally supported Zipf’s law for years after, but not before, 1985.  These 
findings suggest convergence toward Zipf’s law for EU countries, perhaps reflecting 
the more recent efforts by EU member states to further reduced trade and factor 
mobility barriers among themselves.  
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The finding that Zipf’s law holds empirically for the distribution of output and 
factor shares suggests a constraint on the set of admissible growth models that may be 
used to explain the growth experiences of members of an integrated economy.  In 
particular, the empirical significance of the equal-share relationship implies that this 
relative growth performance will be largely random, and hence strongly dependent on 
particular states of nature.  Such randomness will be more true the greater the extent of 
economic integration among members, as perhaps most exemplified by the integrated 
economy comprising US states.  Hence, it is likely to be more true the more 
harmonized are education systems and fiscal codes, when members they do not run 
independent monetary policies, and when industrial policies are quickly imitated across 
members.  Finally, while there may be several explanations for the empirical finding 
that the distribution of output and factor shares fit a power law, the evidence on the 
empirical significance of Zipf’s law suggests that models of the growth of members of 
integrated economies should satisfy a main underlying assumption, namely, that the 
growth process is random and homogeneous across members.  
 15 
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Appendix – Data Methods and Sources 
The output for each of the 51 US states is measured by real gross state product 
as reported by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).10  These data were 
available yearly from 1990 to 2000.   
Estimates of state physical capital stocks were derived from BEA (2002) 
estimates of the total US physical capital stock in each of nine one-digit industrial 
sectors comprising all economic activity. 11   These national physical capital stocks in 
each industry were allocated to each state by multiplying an industry’s total capital 
stock12 by that industry’s contribution to a state’s total income.13  These industry capital 
stock estimates were then summed, for each state, to obtain an estimate of a state’s total 
stock of physical capital. 14  The calculation performed for each state at each time t can 
be expressed algebraically as  
( )
9
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i j ij i
j
k t K t y t Y t
=
é ù= ë ûå  
In this equation, ki(t) is the stock of physical capital in state i, yij(t) is value 
added by industry j in state i  (i = 1…51), Yi(t) is state i’s total value added, and Kj(t) is 
the national level stock of physical capital in industry j (j = 1,…, 9).  This procedure 
assumes that the capital-to-output ratio within an industry j (i.e., kij(t)/yij(t)) is the same 
across US states, that is, kij(t)/yij(t) = Ki(t)/Yi(t).  In turn, this assumption implies that an 
                                                 
10 Data on gross state product available at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/gsp 
11 The sectors (BEA code) are Farming (81), Agricultural services, forestry, fishing & other (100); 
Mining (200); Construction (300); Manufacturing (400); Transportation(500); Wholesale and retail trade 
(610); Finance, insurance and real estate (700); and Services (800). 
12  Data on state physical capital stocks by industry were taken from US Fixed Assets Tables, available at 
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/faweb 
13 Data on annual state personal income (value added) available at 
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/spi 
14 This procedure follows that used by Munnel (1990) and Garofalo and Yamarik (2002). 
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industry is in a common steady state across all US states.15  For example, the 
agricultural sector in Texas is in the same steady state as its counterpart in Oregon, and 
the manufacturing sector in Pennsylvania is in the same steady state as its counterpart 
in Ohio.16  The constructed physical capital data are from 1990 to 2000, on a yearly 
basis. 
State human capital stocks were derived from data on educational attainment in 
each state taken from the US Bureau of the Census.17  Since census data on educational 
attainment are only available every 10 years, this limits the data on stocks of human 
capital to the two years 1990 and 2000. 
For the countries comprising the EU, total output is measured by a country’ s 
real gross domestic product (GDP) derived from the data on real GDP per capita (base 
year = 1996) and population in Penn World Tables 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 
2002).18 The output data were available annually from 1960 to 2000. 
Data on EU physical capital stocks were derived from Penn World Tables 5.6 
(Heston and Summers, 1991and 1991b) which reports four data series for each country: 
(1) population, (2) physical capital stock per worker, (3) real GDP per capita and (4) 
real GDP per worker.19  The physical capital stocks for each country were constructed 
as the product of the first three series divided by the last series.  The data covers the 
period 1965-1990.  Physical capital stock data for EU countries were also available 
                                                 
15 If a sector is converging towards its steady state, the output-to-capital ratio would be below its steady-
state value. This only poses a problem if the initial output-to-capital ratios vary across US states. If the 
ratios do vary, the procedure would allocate too much to those states further from steady-state and too 
little to those states closer to their steady state.  
16 If a sector has a different steady state, and hence a different capital-to-output ratio, the procedure will 
allocate too much to states with lower ratios and too little to states with higher ratios.  However, this 
possibility is unlikely if competition lead firms in all states to adopt the best available production 
technology. 
17  Decennial Census Dataset available at http://factfinder.census.gov 
18  Penn World Tables 6.1 available at http://datacentre2.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt 
19  Penn World Tables 5.6 available at http://datacentre2.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt56 
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from Timmer et al. (2003)20 covering period 1980-2000.21  These data sources were 
combined to have physical capital stock data in each of seven years from 1965 to 
2000.22 
Each EU country’s stock of human capital stock is measured by multiplying the 
percentage of a country’s population having at least a secondary level of education with 
the country’s total population.  Data on the rate of educational attainment for each 
country were taken from Barro and Lee (1993, 1996, and 2000).23  Data on a country’s 
population were from Heston, Summers and Aten (2002).  Since the data on rates of 
educational attainment are only available every 5 years, the data sample is limited to 
five-year intervals from 1960 to 2000.  Following this constraint, the output and 
physical capital stocks were also obtained in five-year intervals. 
The 14 EU countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United 
Kingdom. 24  
                                                 
20 Physical capital database available at http://www.ggdc.net/dseries/growth-accounting.shtml 
21 The series forms the source of the OECD productivity database.  See e.g., Schreyer et al. (2003). 
22 Estimation was conducted using both sets of data for EU countries.  No qualitative difference in results 
was found for the years in which data were available from both sources (i.e., 1980, 1985 and 1990).  For 
these three years we therefore report only the results using the capital stock data from Timmer et al. 
(2003). 
23 Other studies using the Barro-Lee data include Rajan and Zingales (1998), Ramey and Ramey (1995), 
Barro (1999), Easterly and Levine (1998), Hall and Jones (1999) and Sachs and Warner (1995). 
24 Luxembourg is excluded for lack of data on human capital. Given the small scale of Luxembourg’s 
economy relative to other EU countries this omission is unlikely to affect the EU results. 
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Table 1 - OLS Estimates of Rank-Share Relationships for US States 
 
Variable 
(Share) 
Year Intercept (q) Slope (b ) Adjusted R2 
1990 -1.179 (0.222)  1.101 (0.073) 0.887 
1991 -1.194 (0.222)  1.093 (0.073) 0.884 
1992 -1.199 (0.227)  1.090 (0.075) 0.883 
1993 -1.207 (0.234)  1.085 (0.077) 0.881 
1994 -1.208 (0.242)  1.084 (0.079) 0.876 
1995 -1.209 (0.242)  1.083 (0.079) 0.874 
1996 -1.205 (0.242)  1.085 (0.079) 0.872 
1997 -1.192 (0.245)  1.091 (0.080) 0.868 
1998 -1.173 (0.246)  1.100 (0.081) 0.868 
1999 -1.168 (0.244)  1.103 (0.080) 0.866 
Output 
(n = 51) 
2000 -1.164 (0.238)  1.106 (0.078) 0.868 
1990 -1.199 (0.227)  1.092 (0.075) 0.892 
1991 -1.207 (0.230) 1.089 (0.076) 0.891 
1992 -1.200 (0.235) 1.092 (0.077) 0.892 
1993 -1.197 (0.239) 1.093 (0.079) 0.890 
1994 -1.196 (0.247) 1.092 (0.081) 0.884 
1995 -1.173 (0.254) 1.102 (0.083) 0.879 
1996 -1.168 (0.255) 1.105 (0.083) 0.878 
1997 -1.126 (0.261) 1.125 (0.086) 0.870 
1998 -1.126 (0.257) 1.126 (0.084) 0.876 
1999 -1.108 (0.259) 1.135 (0.084) 0.875 
Physical 
Capital 
(n = 51) 
2000 -1.093 (0.258) 1.143 (0.083) 0.880 
1990 -1.244 (0.252) 1.064 (0.082) 0.854 Human Capital 
(n = 51) 2000 -1.264 (0.268) 1.054 (0.088) 0.839 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses; all intercept coefficients are significantly different from zero at 1%; 
all slope coefficients are not significantly different from one at 5%.  
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Table 2 - OLS Estimates of Rank-Share Relationships for EU Countries 
 
Variable (Share) Year Intercept (q) Slope (b ) Adjusted R2 
1960 -0.645 (0.334) 1.461 (0.156) + 0.908 
1965 -0.665 (0.345) 1.435 (0.165) + 0.889 
1970 -0.699 (0.361) 1.406 (0.173) + 0.867 
1975 -0.742 (0.458) 1.366 (0.209) 0.859 
1980 -0.755 (0.430) 1.357 (0.197) 0.870 
1985 -0.763 (0.427) 1.354 (0.195) 0.872 
1990 -0.772 (0.430) 1.346 (0.195) 0.872 
1995 -0.777 (0.420) 1.343 (0.182) 0.878 
Output 
(n = 14) 
2000 -0.857 (0.392)* 1.272 (0.171) 0.885 
1965 -0.816 (0.440) 1.293 (0.232) 0.851 
1970 -0.825 (0.402) 1.275 (0.212) 0.858 
1975 -0.836 (0.361)* 1.262 (0.195) 0.858 
1980 -0.760 (0.350) 1.332 (0.177) 0.828 
1985 -0.732 (0.289) * 1.358 (0.142) + 0.870 
1990 -0.670 (0.435) 1.418 (0.215) 0.873 
1995 -0.632 (0.321) 1.457 (0.154) + 0.908 
Physical Capital 
(n = 14) 
2000 -0.658 (0.388) 1.431 (0.176) + 0.904 
1960 -0.147 (0.492) 2.103 (0.302) ++ 0.791 
1965 -0.343 (0.327) 1.890 (0.169) ++ 0.880 
1970 -0.529 (0.213) * 1.639 (0.110) ++ 0.865 
1975 -0.642 (0.177) ** 1.518 (0.080) ++ 0.928 
1980 -0.683 (0.182) ** 1.433 (0.071) ++ 0.933 
1985 -0.747 (0.133) ** 1.409 (0.049) ++ 0.945 
1990 -0.895 (0.235) ** 1.241 (0.125) 0.912 
1995 -0.897 (0.247) ** 1.225 (0.128) 0.912 
Human Capital 
(n = 14) 
2000 -0.905 (0.237) ** 1.215 (0.120) 0.919 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses;  
*   significantly different from zero at 5%;     
** significantly different from zero at 1%; 
+   significantly diffe rent from one at 5%; 
++  significantly different from one at 1%. 
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Table 3 - Monte Carlo Analysis of OLS Estimates of the Relationship between the 
Share and Rank of Shares 
 
Number of Integrated Economy Members (N) 
Statistic 14  
(EU) 20 
51 
(US States) 100 200 
1) OLS slope (E( bˆ ))  1.172 1.143 1.081 1.054 1.034 
2) Bias (E( bˆ ) – 1 )  0.172 0.143 0.081 0.054 0.034 
3) Prob( bˆ  > 1 )  0.629 0.632 0.634 0.629 0.619 
4) Average OLS std. error  0.089 0.065 0.029 0.016 0.009 
5) True std. error of bˆ   0.401 0.329 0.200 0.142 0.100 
6) True 95% confidence 
interval for OLS slope 
[0.544, 
2.104] 
[0.610, 
1.893] 
[0.734, 
1.517] 
[0.802, 
1.354] 
[0.851, 
1.241] 
 
Notes:  Each column based on 100,000 Monte Carlo simulations (each with N observations) drawn from 
an exact power law with coefficient 1 (Zipf’s Law).  This involved drawing N i.i.d. variables vi uniformly 
distributed in the interval [0, 1] and then constructing sizes Li = 1/vi.  The Li were then normalized into 
shares Si which were then ordered and assigned a rank value Ri.  100,000 OLS regressions were then 
performed using the specification log(Si) = q + b log(1/Ri) + ui.   Row 1 shows the average value of the 
OLS slope estimates across the 100,000 regressions for sample size N.  Row 2 measures the extent of the 
bias in the estimated slope from its theoretical value of unity.  Row 3 gives the proportion of OLS 
estimated slopes whose value exceeded unity; a value above 0.5 indicates an upward bias of the OLS 
slope estimate.  Row 4 gives the average value of the OLS standard error across the 100,000 regressions.  
Row 5 gives the standard deviation of the 100,000 OLS slope estimates; this value estimates the true 
standard error of the sampling distribution of the OLS slope estimate.  Row 6 shows the range that 
included 95% of 100,000 simulated OLS slope estimates. 
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Table 4 - Results Testing the Equal-Share Relationship 
 
p-values for testing across-equation  
homogeneity of Integrated Economy Year 
intercepts  slopes  
1990 0.9680 0.9014 
US States 
2000 0.8241 0.5964 
1965 0.6063 0.0445* 
1970 0.8011 0.2797 
1975 0.8619 0.3655 
1980 0.9689 0.8461 
1985 0.9969 0.9305 
1990 0.8111 0.6034 
1995 0.7124 0.3697 
European Union 
2000 0.7291 0.4072 
 * Cross-equation homogeneity is rejected at 5% level. 
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Figure 1 – Actual, Estimated and Theoretical Share -Rank Distribution of Output Shares for US States, 2000 
 
Zipf's Law - Theory vs. Actual vs. Estimated - 
US Output 2000
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49
Rank
Sh
ar
e Theoretical
Actual
Estimated
 
 25 
Figure 2 - Actual, Estimated and Theoretical Rank-Share Distribution of Output Shares for EU Countries, 2000 
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